I was having this conversation with my son yesterday "what is a computer" as he wants to dual boot his computer, but doesn't understand how they work, hence me finding a physical embodiment of a Turing machine.
Though yes, "when life gives you a brain" is excellent. I though I recognized some of the arguments.
Another powerful thought piece here, Alex. I've been thinking a lot lately about RQM (Relational Quantum Mechanics), where events are all that there is. It's not really sensible to say something exists unless it interacts with something else, for that is when we actually can tell something is real. Reality, then, is constructed by disparate and connected events.
Observation and consciousness are ultra-interesting here too. If you look at something, you're necessarily interacting yourself, so observers create reality within this framework.
This ("Are brains and computers alike?") is about computers and brains, but it's also about the nature of reality. All of these conversations relating to AI are ultra-useful since they cause us to examine ourselves from a different point of view, something I can't seem to get enough of these days.
I’m mostly on the side of “brain is a computer that we don’t completely understand yet” but…
The most common argument that I hear against the position is that the physical architecture of brains changes (new synapses form etc) in a way that doesn't happen (yet) in computers.
Great point. We somewhat addressed it when we discussed that neural networks, even though not exactly brain simulators, are way closer to this idea of a flexible, evolving architecture, but yes, it is a good enough argument that deserves its own discussion. Thanks ;)
Haha thanks man, I'm glad you enjoyed it. And being called a meat suit could, in some contexts, be considered flattering. I can't think of one now but that doesn't mean it couldn't happen.
Perhaps in a future dystopian world where our best option is being a temporary meat suit for our robot overlords? I'm not selling this very well, am I?
I have, the first two episodes. I really wanted to like the show - the premise and the setting was right up my alley. But I felt the writing and the acting wasn't on par.
"But the inner workings of the human mind and the nature of consciousness may be neither measurable nor quantifiable."
Or rather, even if they can be measurable and quantifiable, clearly that's not ALL they are. How can phenomenal experience, which is qualitative, ever be fully captured by a purely quantitative method? Of course, this is where so much disagreement lies.
On computationalism, I think Chalmers was right to call it the REALLY HARD problem of consciousness. Not only do we not know whether computers can be conscious, we can't know. Here is where people like to argue that we can't know other minds are conscious either, but I think that's a false equivalency. It's one thing to skirt the problem of other minds to avoid solipsism, but supposing something that we built could be having inner experiences goes a step further. We don't need to suppose AI consciouniousness to avoid solipsism.
Totally agree we don't need to accept AI consciousness to avoid solipsism. For me, solipsism is self-refuting. You can't be a solipsist, because if solipsism is true, then only I can be a solipsist, no one else can. I do think however if we don't accept functionalism in general, we'll have a hard time accepting anything is conscious other than humans.
Yeah, solipsism's pretty hard to take seriously. But as for avoiding biological chauvinism (or whatever you want to call it), functionalism isn't the only position in philosophy of mind that does the trick—panpsychism, for instance!
Speaking from a layman's perspective here but pansychism has always seemed to me a bit like begging the question. Why is consciousness? Well, because it is! I'm oversimplifying of course, but still, it doesn't solve Chalmer's hard problem, right? It still has to explain how those micro consciousness integrate into a big, sentient consciousness. Isn't that just dualism with extra steps?
I thought the same thing at first too, but there are a bazillion different panpsychisms out there these days apparently. It can get confusing. Many are basically physicalist, but others are more Leibniz-idealist. But generally the idea behind panpsychism is to avoid the hard problem (otherwise, as you say, what's the point?) You're right, though, that the problems panpsychism usually faces are the combination problem and the subject unity problem, but those aren't like the hard problem. I recently had a guest propose his panpsychist theory on my blog and he claims to avoid those problems (I'll leave it for you to decide). There he gives an easy to read breakdown of various theories of mind and what he sees as their problems:
I'm not sure what I make of his theory, but it's certainly different and interesting and doesn't seem to lean too physicalist for my tastes. Generally I prefer idealism, but I don't think too many people will be switching over to my view any time soon. :)
Thanks! Hope you find it worthwhile. Mostyn, by the way, published quite a few papers on philosophy of mind in Journals for Consciousness studies and he’s a nice guy who taught philosophy, so if you have questions, feel free to ask.
Great read, Alejandro. Functionalism and computationalism in your account of mind are neither weak nor strong positions. I watched your balances tilt from strong (of course computers are brains) to weak (Mary had a little lamb its fleece was red as blood) to moderate and then end up perfectly balanced. It was cool to watch you parallel the logic position with symmetrical attention to religion and emotions. Very nice writing!
Thanks Terry, you're always too kind. I tried to maintain a healthy balance of arguments and counter-arguments. Personally, I lean more towards strong computationalism, but there is too much we don't know yet, about most stuff, so I try to leave some space for skepticism, in all matters.
I was having this conversation with my son yesterday "what is a computer" as he wants to dual boot his computer, but doesn't understand how they work, hence me finding a physical embodiment of a Turing machine.
Though yes, "when life gives you a brain" is excellent. I though I recognized some of the arguments.
Suzi is in my top-3 favorite Substack writers for sure :)
It’s intriguing how this continues to fascinate. Thank you.
Thank you for your kind words.
Another powerful thought piece here, Alex. I've been thinking a lot lately about RQM (Relational Quantum Mechanics), where events are all that there is. It's not really sensible to say something exists unless it interacts with something else, for that is when we actually can tell something is real. Reality, then, is constructed by disparate and connected events.
Observation and consciousness are ultra-interesting here too. If you look at something, you're necessarily interacting yourself, so observers create reality within this framework.
This ("Are brains and computers alike?") is about computers and brains, but it's also about the nature of reality. All of these conversations relating to AI are ultra-useful since they cause us to examine ourselves from a different point of view, something I can't seem to get enough of these days.
Thanks man. Yes, ultimately all questions lead to "who am I", right? I love to tickle your brain!
I think we just created reality. Did we just create reality?
I’m mostly on the side of “brain is a computer that we don’t completely understand yet” but…
The most common argument that I hear against the position is that the physical architecture of brains changes (new synapses form etc) in a way that doesn't happen (yet) in computers.
Great point. We somewhat addressed it when we discussed that neural networks, even though not exactly brain simulators, are way closer to this idea of a flexible, evolving architecture, but yes, it is a good enough argument that deserves its own discussion. Thanks ;)
"We can't simply paste your thoughts into some portable device, load them into a freshly minted meat suit, and get a second copy of you."
And yet I've been called "a freshly minted meat suit" more times than I can count. Explain that, science.
This was a great deep dive, which I've only finally gotten around to reading in full a week after you sent it.
Haha thanks man, I'm glad you enjoyed it. And being called a meat suit could, in some contexts, be considered flattering. I can't think of one now but that doesn't mean it couldn't happen.
Perhaps in a future dystopian world where our best option is being a temporary meat suit for our robot overlords? I'm not selling this very well, am I?
You've seen Altered Carbon?
I have, the first two episodes. I really wanted to like the show - the premise and the setting was right up my alley. But I felt the writing and the acting wasn't on par.
Yeah, execution is far from perfect but the premise is pretty neat!
"But the inner workings of the human mind and the nature of consciousness may be neither measurable nor quantifiable."
Or rather, even if they can be measurable and quantifiable, clearly that's not ALL they are. How can phenomenal experience, which is qualitative, ever be fully captured by a purely quantitative method? Of course, this is where so much disagreement lies.
On computationalism, I think Chalmers was right to call it the REALLY HARD problem of consciousness. Not only do we not know whether computers can be conscious, we can't know. Here is where people like to argue that we can't know other minds are conscious either, but I think that's a false equivalency. It's one thing to skirt the problem of other minds to avoid solipsism, but supposing something that we built could be having inner experiences goes a step further. We don't need to suppose AI consciouniousness to avoid solipsism.
Totally agree we don't need to accept AI consciousness to avoid solipsism. For me, solipsism is self-refuting. You can't be a solipsist, because if solipsism is true, then only I can be a solipsist, no one else can. I do think however if we don't accept functionalism in general, we'll have a hard time accepting anything is conscious other than humans.
Yeah, solipsism's pretty hard to take seriously. But as for avoiding biological chauvinism (or whatever you want to call it), functionalism isn't the only position in philosophy of mind that does the trick—panpsychism, for instance!
Speaking from a layman's perspective here but pansychism has always seemed to me a bit like begging the question. Why is consciousness? Well, because it is! I'm oversimplifying of course, but still, it doesn't solve Chalmer's hard problem, right? It still has to explain how those micro consciousness integrate into a big, sentient consciousness. Isn't that just dualism with extra steps?
I thought the same thing at first too, but there are a bazillion different panpsychisms out there these days apparently. It can get confusing. Many are basically physicalist, but others are more Leibniz-idealist. But generally the idea behind panpsychism is to avoid the hard problem (otherwise, as you say, what's the point?) You're right, though, that the problems panpsychism usually faces are the combination problem and the subject unity problem, but those aren't like the hard problem. I recently had a guest propose his panpsychist theory on my blog and he claims to avoid those problems (I'll leave it for you to decide). There he gives an easy to read breakdown of various theories of mind and what he sees as their problems:
https://open.substack.com/pub/philosophyandfiction/p/a-testable-solution-to-the-mind-body?r=schg4&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
I'm not sure what I make of his theory, but it's certainly different and interesting and doesn't seem to lean too physicalist for my tastes. Generally I prefer idealism, but I don't think too many people will be switching over to my view any time soon. :)
Oh I'm checking this for sure! Thanks for sharing and you just got a new reader in me ;)
Thanks! Hope you find it worthwhile. Mostyn, by the way, published quite a few papers on philosophy of mind in Journals for Consciousness studies and he’s a nice guy who taught philosophy, so if you have questions, feel free to ask.
Great read, Alejandro. Functionalism and computationalism in your account of mind are neither weak nor strong positions. I watched your balances tilt from strong (of course computers are brains) to weak (Mary had a little lamb its fleece was red as blood) to moderate and then end up perfectly balanced. It was cool to watch you parallel the logic position with symmetrical attention to religion and emotions. Very nice writing!
Thanks Terry, you're always too kind. I tried to maintain a healthy balance of arguments and counter-arguments. Personally, I lean more towards strong computationalism, but there is too much we don't know yet, about most stuff, so I try to leave some space for skepticism, in all matters.